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ABS'IRACT 
Several aggre gate-level studies have found a re l at ionship 
between macroeconomic cond i t ions and e l e c t ion outcome s ,  operating in 
intuitively p l aus ible directions .  More recent survey-based studies , 
however , have been unable to de tect any comparable relat ionship 
operat ing at the individual-voter leve l .  Thi s per sistent di screpency 
is puz z l ing . One recently propo sed e xpl anat ion for it is that voters 
actual ly behave in an al truist i c  or " soc iotropic" fashion, re sponding 
to economic e vent s only as they affect the general wel fare, rather 
than in terms of sel f-interested "pocketbook" considerat ions . 
It is argued here that the di screpenc i e s  between the macro­
and micro- level studies are a stat ist i cal art ifac t ,  aris ing from the 
f ac t  that ob servabl e  chang e s  in individual welfare actual ly consist of 
two unobservab l e  component s ,  a gover11111ent- induced ( and pol i tically 
re levant ) component , and an exogenous component caused by l if e-cyc l e  
and other pol i t i c a l ly irrel evant fac t or s .  It i s  shown that because of 
thi s ,  individual-level cro s s-sect ional e st imate s  of the effects of 
wel fare chang e s  on vot ing are badly b i a sed and are e ssent i a l ly 
unrel ated to the true val ue s of the behavioral parameters of int erest : 
they w il l  gene r a l ly be considerable underest imate s ,  and may even be of 
the wrong s i gn .  An aggregate-level t ime-series analy s i s ,  on the other 
hand, w i l l  often yield rea sonably good ( if somewhat at tenuated) 
e st imat e s  of the underlying individual-level effect s of interest . 
Thus , in this c a s e ,  individual behavior is best inve st igated with 
aggre gate- rather than ind iv idual- level dat a .  
It i s  al so shown that the evidence for soc iotropic voting i s  
artif ac t ua l , i n  the sense that the various f indings and evidence which 
ostens ibly show sociotropic behavior are all perfectly compat ible with
the nul l hypothe s i s  of sel f- interested "pocke tbook" vot ing . 
Political scient ist s are well aware of the dangers of basing 
inferences about individual behavior on aggregate data. The well­
known works1 on t he "fallacy of ecological inference" have become 
t imeless classics in political methodology, and occupy a secure niche 
in the syllabus of every introduct ory research methods course. 
Aggregate data, while st ill indispensible in areas such as hist orical 
research, is now generally recognized as an inferior substitute for 
individual-level data, and empirical results based solely on 
aggregate-level analyses, however elaborate, are normally regarded 
with due caution until confirmed by a proper individual-level study. 
The importance of attempt ing t his kind of confirmation is widely 
appreciated: even negative inst ances, in which the aggregat e results 
do not st and up at the individual level--real-world examples of the 
ecological fallacy at work�nevertheless perform an important service, 
in redirecting s cientific attent ion away from the macro-level findings 
and on t o  the real task of analyzing and explaining t he individual-
level results. Sometimes, indeed, this may lead t o  major substantive 
revisions in knowledge. 
Recent development s in the continuing flow of st udies on the 
electoral impact of economic conditions provide a current case in 
point . On the one hand several earlier studies,2 based on time series 
analysis of aggregate data, have found some association bet ween 
macroeconomic conditions and elect ion out comes (or aggregate 
popularity measures), operating in intuitively plausible directions. 
Though there are differences in the detailed natures and magnitudes of 
the specific effects uncovered in different st udies of this kind, the 
general finding of a plaus ible and reasonably st rong relationship is 
one which comes t hrough rather persist ently in this work. On the 
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3 other hand, more recent s urvey-based st udies have been unable t o  
detect any comparable relationship between individual vot ing behavior 
and personal economic circumst ances. Despite considerable 
experimentation with different variables, models, and hypotheses, such 
associations as have been found at the individual level are generally 
quite modest in magnitude, and in particular are t oo weak to account 
for the aggregate-level effects t ypically found in the time-series 
st udies. Moreover, the individual-level effect s seem to be quite 
unst able, varying considerably from one election to the next; often, 
in fact , t hey are of the "wrong• sign, pointing to effect s which 
operate in directions which are intuitively implausible, and/or 
inconsist ent with those of well-documented aggregate-level effects. 
These discrepencies between the aggregate and individual-level 
findings pose a challenging int ellectual puzzle, and have inspired 
several explanat ory effort s.4 One particularly int eresting 
explanation is t he "sociotropic voting• thesis,5 based on the premise 
that voters assess and respond t o  economic conditions in terms of 
altruist ic or "sociotropic" considerations, according to what is good 
or bad for the country as a whole, rat her t han in t erms of their a1rn 
personal self- interest s, narr<11rly defined. The discovery that voters 
do not simply "vot e their pocketbooks, " but rather respond t o  economic 
event s primarily in terms of the collective welfare, is a very 
int erest ing one, with pot entially important implications for our 
underst anding of contemporary electoral politics, and for democratic 
theory generally. It therefore deserves a closer look. 
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Our purpose here is t o  explore some of the implicit inference 
problems arising in t his work, to try to get some insight int o t he 
nature of the empirical evidence and its bearing on the inferences 
drawn from it, We proceed by assuming t hat time-series and cross­
sect ional data are generated by a single, fixed electorate, whose 
behavior is governed by a specified behavioral hypot heses, and t hat 
regression analyses are performed on t hese two bodies of data in order 
to est imate the parameters of the underlying behavioral relationship. 
These est imates are then examined t o  see how they compare, and how 
successful each is in measuring t he true, underlying behavioral 
effects we are trying to inf er. On the basis of this analysis, we 
shall conclude the following: 
First , there is nothing in t he apparently anamolous empirical 
evidence which requires much by way of substantive explanation. The 
discrepencies between the macro and micro-level st udies are basically 
a statistical artifact , and do not show any real disagreement about 
the true values of the underlying behavioral parameters of int erest ; 
they arise simply because the time-series and cross-sect ional analyses 
are est imating t wo quite different derivative empirical relationships, 
neither of which is a perfect reflect ion of the real behavioral 
relat ionship we are ultimat ely interest ed in making inferences about . 
As we shall show, even when the underlying behavioral rel ationship 
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which governs individual voting decisions is the same for every vot er 
in every election, the observable aggregat e-level and individual-level 
empirical relationships between measurable economic variables and 
vot es will still differ considerably from each other. Regression 
analyses of these two relationships will thus inevitably yield quite 
different est imates, There is no reason whatever to expect t ime­
series and cross-sectional estimates of the same parameters t o  be 
similar in magnitude; they need not even be of the same sign. 
Secondly and more importantly, of the two kinds of analyses, 
it is t he aggregate time-series evidence--rat her than that based on 
individual-level survey data�which is most likely to yield valid 
inferences about t he underlying individual-level behavioral effects we 
are trying t o  measure. Est imates from either kind of data will be 
biased. Under plausible data and parameter assumpt ions, however, t he 
bias in t he aggregate-level est imates will be a relatively modest and 
tractable one, and in many cases they should convey a reasonably 
accurate idea of the underlying relationship. The individual-level 
cross-sect ional estimates, on the other hand, are hopelessly 
contaminated. They depend only tenuously on the true parameter 
values, and in general are so badly and unpredictably biased as to be 
essentially unrelated to the underlying individual-level behavioral 
parameters we are trying to estimate. 
Thirdly, the evidence for sociotropic voting is artifact ual. 
The various findings and evidence which ostensibly show sociotropic 
voting cannot, in fact, effect ivel y discriminate between that and 
s 
self-interest ed behavior, and are all perfectly compatible with the 
null hypot hesis of self-interest ed npocket book" voting. It is 
certainly possible, even likely, that American voters are not driven 
exclusively by self-int erest, and t hat they also respond t o  altruistic 
or sociotropic considerations to some degree. However, persuasive 
empirical demonstration of this, or meaningful estimation of the 
extent to which these two factors operate in t he electorate, will be a 
formidably difficult task, on conceptual as well as methodological 
grounds. 
More generally, our analyses suggest s that individual-level 
survey data, at least when analyzed with the usual methods, is not 
really useful for st udying the effects of short-term economic 
fluct uations on individual voting decisions. While it may ultimately 
be possible to draw valid inferences from such data, this will require 
careful modeling and specification of the underlying st ruct ures and 
effects to be estimated, and sophist icated estimation t echniques which 
take proper account of the subt leties involved. It is clear that 
st raightforward multiple regression (or probit, or cross-tabulation) 
analysis of vot e int entions on a set of economic and control variables 
will not do the job, and is likely to yield only spurious estimates 
w hich are virtually unrelated to the true effects. It would t herefore 
seem prudent to regard .!lllY finding in this area based on individual­
level survey data with caut ion, until and unless it can be shown to be 
unaffected by the problems described below. 
Finally, the analysis here may also have some broader 
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implications for the general problem of ecological inference. In the 
problem we consider, it turns out to be an aggregate-level analyses, 
rather than one based on individual-level data, which is most likely 
to yield valid inferences about individual behavior. Of course this 
conclusion is not a general one, since the argument s on which it rest s 
are specific t o  the particular data and problem at hand. Still, the 
example is certainl y not an isolated one. Moreover, even t he specific 
example may be of some general int erest, if only as a useful 
correct ive against unwarrant ed generalizations baaed on a somewhat 
uncareful reading of the ecological fallacy literature. There is 
nothing inherent ly wrong, or suspect, about aggregate data, and 
findings based on such data are not J!.!!'. .!.£ any more ( or less) in need 
of independent corroboration than those based on any other kind of 
data. It is t rue, of course, that aggregate-level findings are 
typically compatable with a variet y of alternative individual-level 
hypot heses or mechanisms, and in this sense can never completely 
identify the individual- level effects. But t his is true of 
individual-level findings as well; for an example, see Section S 
below. Identification problems are not unique to aggregate-level 
analyses, and may be at least as severe when working with individual­
level data. 
There are situations, clearly, in which certain kinds of 
individual behaviors can be st udied most effectively, or only, with 
individual- level data of the proper kind. But this does not mean that 
individual-level data as such is necessarily always well suited for 
studying the behavior of individuals, or that aggregation is 
necessarily bad, or undesireable: 7 in many cases--as in t he example 
st udied below--aggregation bias may turn out t o  be a lesser and minor 
evil, compared t o  measurement error, response biases, or other 
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problems inherent in the available individual-level data. Int elligent 
methodological choices can only be made by realist ically considering 
all such sources of error or bias, in t he context of the specific 
problem at hand, and without preconceptions for or against any 
particular type of data or level of analysis. This, we think, is t he 
proper conclusion t o  be drawn from ecological fallac y, and from the 
rather different arguments which follow. 
1 • INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
It may be useful t o  introduce the formal argument by first 
sketching out a simple example which illustrates how an individual­
level analysis will fail to est imate t he true effects properly, while 
an aggregate-level analysis may not. 
Consider an election (19 80? ) in which the administ ration's 
poor handling of macroeconomic policy causes a substantial and 
widespread decline in personal incomes, which in t urn leads t o  a 
general reject ion of the incumbent at the polls. Of course, the 
incumbent will still receive .!.2!!!2 votes ( or positive popularity 
ratings, which for present purposes we regard as equivalent t o  vot es), 
since strong partisans of the incumbent party (or those who are 
favorably influenced by its performance on ot her, noneconomic issues) 
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will still tend t o  favor it, though less strongly than would otherwise 
be the case: a uniform shift against the incumbent does not mean that 
everyone vot es against it, but rath�� that the overall distribution of 
partisan preferences is shifted dowmrard, against the incumbent . The 
same is t rue for the independent variable: indeed, even if the net 
effect of administration policies were to impose precisely identical 
income losses on every vot er, we would still see considerable 
variation in t he observed changes in overall incomes, since individual 
incomes are also affected in a variet y of other nongovernmental 
influences (ent ries or retirements from the workforce, promotions or 
seniority-relat ed raises, inheritances or other windfall gains and 
losses) which st ill vary considerably across individuals. Government 
macroeconomic policies do not eliminate these idiosyncratic 
differences, but rather simply induce shifts in the overall 
dist ribut ion of individual income changes, upwards or downwards. 
Therefore, if we consider the two variables together, it is 
evident t hat the main effect operating in this hypothetical election 
will be a shift in the position of the entire bivariate dist ribution 
or scatterplot , downward and t o  the left of its position in a 
"normal," nonrecession elect ion, as shown in Figure la. It is not 
clear that there should be any particular effect on the � of the 
individual-level scatterplot itself, or indeed what this shape should 
[Figure 1 about here] 
be in t he first place. To consider j ust one possibilit y, if the 
government-induced income losses were precisely the same for every 
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voter. all variation in individual income changes would be due to the 
exogenous idiosyncratic effects. If these factors should happen to 
operate so as to redistribute incomes upwards ( as is typical in post­
war U. S .  recessions), the larger changes will tend to fall 
disproportionately on upper-income voters, who in turn are more likely 
to be Republicans in their partisan predispositions. Thus with a 
Democratic incumbent under these conditions we might actually find a 
modest negatiye correlation between votes and income changes at the 
individual level, as shown in the figure. This cross-sectional 
correlation tells us nothing about the actual effects of economic 
conditions on individual voting decisions: it is quite spurious, and 
arises simply because the "lucky" voters who receive the above-average 
income gains happen ( in this case) to be anti-administration 
Republicans to begin with. In any event, the essential point is that 
whatever the final shape of the scatterplot, the relationship it 
represents, between individual-level income changes and votes in the 
election in question, is quite unrelated to the main effect of 
interest, tho overall shift in the position of the scatterplot itself. 
In an aggregate- level statistical analysis we would not work 
with the individual- level scatterplot, but would replace it by 
aggregate summary statistics such as Vt and Yt• the mean vote and 
income change in election t. In a time- series anal ysis we are 
essentially fitting a regression line to the (Vt, Yt) points over a 
series of elections. As Figure lb shows, if there is enough variation 
in the sample of elections. the regression l ine will convey a good 
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idea of how the scatterplot shifts position from one election to 
another as economic conditions change, so the time series regression 
coefficient, bTS, may well be a good estimate of how voters respond to
variations in government economic performance. 
In an individual-level cross-sectional analysis, on the other 
hand, we would instead fit a regression line to one of tho individual 
scatterplots; since these are well-behaved, with variation in both 
individual-level variables, wo will still obtain a well-defined, and 
possibly oven significant, cross-sectir.ual regression coefficient, 
bes. But since this regression coefficient is invariant under changes 
in the means of the dependent or independent variables, it will 
totally miss the important effect, the change in the overall position 
of the scatterplot itself ( which is, essentially, a change in means). 
Thus, whatever the relationship being estimated by the cross-sectional 
regression, it is cl early not the one we are interested in. This, in 
essence, is why tho individual-level cross-sectional estimates go awry. 
We turn now to a more careful and explicit analysis of those 
and related issues. Before developing the analytical argument in 
detail, however, it will bo well to note two general caveats which 
should be kept in mind throughout. 
First, we take as a given that the substantive question of 
interest is that of how the government's performance in managing the 
economy during its term in office affects its fortunes in the 
subsequent election. Thus, we assume the policies and actions 
undertaken by the administration eventual ly result in economic gains 
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or losses t o  voters; the question to be studied is whether, and how, 
t hese gains and losses in t urn affect t heir subsequent vot ing 
decisions at election t ime. We make no specific assumpt ions as t o  t he 
nature or form of the relevant effects, e. g. , as t o  whether they are 
incumbency- or party-oriented in direction, or are primarily self­
int erest ed, or "sociotropic, " in nature. We do assume, however, that 
we are ultimately int erest ed only in how real economic out comes affect 
actual vot ing decisions, and not in economic rhetoric or percept ual 
imagery as such. Thus, a finding t o  the effect t hat the popularit y of 
an incumbent administ ration is correlated with voters' assessment s of 
its success in managing the economy would be relevant for our purposes 
only to t he extent that such popularity ratings and performance 
assessments are related to actual voting decisions and real economic 
out comes. If ( t o  t ake an extreme case) vot ers' self-reported 
assessments of the state of economy turn out t o  be simply the product 
of their partisan predispositions or their exposure to an intensive 
media campaign, and are unrelated t o  actual, measurable economic 
events, then t he empirical finding in quest ion would have no bearing 
on the basic question of int erest here. This point is particularly 
relevant t o  Section 5 ,  where we consider vot ers' subj ective
perceptions of the performance of the economy as an explanatory 
variable; in the earlier sections things are generally posed in "real" 
terms throughout . 
Secondly, within the substantive context described above, the 
specific issue t oward which the analysis is directed is that of cross-
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sectional analyses of individual-level ( e. g. , survey) data, versus 
t ime-series analyses of aggregate data. Obviously, other combinations 
of these cat egories are logically possible as well, e. g. , t ime-series 
analyses of individual-level ( e. g. ,  panel) data, or cross- sect ional 
aggregate-level ana lyses (e. g. , by st ates), but we shall not be 
directly concerned with these. In the int erest of brevity we wil 1 
usually simply refer, int erchangeably, to "cross-sectional" or 
"individual-level" or "micro-level" versus "aggregate- level" or "time­
series" variables or estimates, without repeating all of the above 
qualifications; they are int ended throughout, however. 
This said, we turn now t o  the analysis. In section 2 we 
sketch out a simplified bivariate version of the models used in t his 
area, in which changes in individuals' personal economic wellbeing ( as 
measured by their real incomes) are an important influence on t heir 
subsequent voting decisions. Technical details and derivat ions are 
relegated t o  an Appendix (available uu request ) .  In Sections 3 and 4 
we show that the model, along with plausible substantive assumptions 
about the variances and covariances of the various economic and 
political variables involved, predicts the following empirical 
results: In an aggregate, time-series regression, the time-series 
est imat e bTS will depend direct ly, t hough with some moderate 
at tenuation, on t he true coeff icient p. Hence, if the underlying 
effect is strong enough, we should expect to find a reasonably strong 
est imat ed relationship, in the proper direction, between changes in 
per capita income and aggregate elect ion returns ( or popularit y, or 
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whatever). In a regression across individuals, on the other hand, the 
true effect will be heavily attenuated, and the cross-sectional 
coefficient bes will be sensitive t o  a spurious covariance term, which 
depends on t he (quite irrelevant) correlation between individual 
income changes and partisan predispositions. These two variables are 
unlikely to be very highly correlated, so t he estimated cross­
sect ional relationship will generally be weak or nonexist ent. But 
t here is also good reason to believe that direction and magnitude of 
the income change-partisanship correlation--the tail that wags the dog 
in the cross-sectional estimate--will vary with the stage of the 
business cycle, the identity of the incumbent, and other factors which 
change over time. Hence, in addition to a weak relationship, we 
should also expect t o  find an unstable one, which varies considerably 
from one election to the next. perhaps even with some occasional sign 
reversals, These predictions are, of course. a reasonably accurate if 
somewhat stylized descript ion of the main features of what t he various 
t ime-series and cross-sectional survey studies have, in fact. found. 
The empirical results of these studies thus confirm the basic 
hypot hesis and common-sense assU111ptions mentioned above, and show 
lit tle else beyond t hat. 
In Section S we turn t o  a different mat ter, and consider the 
evidence for altruist ic or "sociotropic" voting. The argument here is 
severalfold. We first show that the sociotropic voting hypot hesis 
implies essentially the same empirical findings as those predict ed by 
the earlier, " self-int erested" model: a reasonably st rong aggregate-
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level effect , and a weak and unst able relation between votes and 
personal wellbeing at the individual level. This evidence. therefore, 
does not distinguish between sociotropic and self-int erest ed behavior. 
We then consider an additional (and more persuasive) body of evidence 
on the quest ion, which shows a positive relationship between 
individuals' vote int entions and their "sociotropic judgments," or 
percept ions of the administration's overall success in managing the 
economy at large. We show that with a purely aociotropic electorate 
these " sociotropic performance ratings" should indeed be positively 
related t o  individual votes. This relationship, however, is a 
spurious one, and is essentially unrelated to the underlying 
behavioral relationship of interest , The cross-sectional estimate 
obtained by regressing vot es on performance ratings, in particular, is 
hopelessly biased, and in fact is quite independent of the true value 
of the underlying sociotropic behavioral parameter. Moreover, this 
spurious relationship between votes and subjective "performance 
ratings" would also be observed even with a purely self-interest ed 
electorate, in which voters respond solely to personal "pocketbook" 
issues, and not at all to sociotropic considerations. 
Thus none of the currently available evidence on the question 
is capable of effectively discriminating between sociotropic and self­
int erest ed behavior. While sociotrori c .:oncerns may indeed be an 
important influence on vot er behavior, the task of demonstrating this, 
and more generally of obt aining meaningful estimates of their impact , 
is one which remains t o  be performed .  
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2 • THE JIODEL 
To keep things simple, we shall ignore various real ist ic but 
ine ssential compl ications which arise from stochastic variabil ity, or 
from the need to  control fer differing incumbencies or other 
extraneous variables. To reduce the problem to its essence, consider 
the fol lowing s impl ified case: A fixed el ectorate of n voters 
( i = 1 ,2 ,  • • •• n) votes in each of T elections (t = 1 ,2 ,  • • • ,T). The 
same party happens to be incumbent during all  el ections.7 Voters vote 
by expressing a j udgment for or against the incumbent party, which we 
assume to be a continuous variable; we denote by vit the "vote" or
j udgment of the ith voter in the tth elect ion.8 The administration' s
economic pol icies ( and other actions) affect the personal financial 
wel lbeing of voters, and these gains or l os se s  are assumed to 
influence their  subsequent voting behavior in a simple and direct way .  
In particular, we assume that the relevant f inancial impacts on voter 
i can be represented as  a change in his real income, and that i ' s  vote 
in election t is  de termined by the fol lowing s impl e ,  purely 
de termini st ic rel ation: 
( i) vit = ai + Pait '
where git is the government-induced change in i ' s  income over the
period proceeding the election, and ai and p are unknown parameters .
9
(We are thus impl icitly assuming •se lf- interested" voters who re spond 
to change s in their own incomes; the alternative possibil ity, of 
al truistic or "sociotropic" voters, is considered exp! ici tly in 
section S below.) If git were zero--i. e . ,  if administration pol icy
had a precisely neutral effect on i ' s  income--then i ' s  vote would be 
v it ai; hence the parameter ai is e s sentially a measure of i ' s
partisan predisposition, or of the extent to which i is di sposed to 
vote for the administration on the basis of other, noneconomic , 
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issues. The behavioral parameter p, which measures the dependence of 
votes on admini stration economic performance, is the one we want to 
est imate; we assume this is es sential ly constant across votera ( in 
contrast to the partisanship parameter ai, which varies from voter to
voter). 
If we could observe the variables git and vit over several
el ections for all voters, it would in principle be a simpl e matter (at 
least for the deterministic case we are considering) to est imate the 
ai and P parameters. Moreover, even if such indiv idual-level panel
data were not available, we could stil l est imate the parameter of 
interest , p, in other ways, e.g . , with aggregate-level data over a 
series of elections. In particular, if we form the aggregate- level 
variables Vt = l/n L i vit (the aggregate vote for the incumbent in
elect ion t) and Gt = l/n L i git (the average government-induced
income change at t), it is then a simple matter to see that the 
rel ation between these aggregate-level variables is 
Vt l /n L i vit l/n L i (ai + pgit) from ( i)
l/n L i ai + p l/n L i git a + PGt'
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where a =  1/n [: i ai is  the mean parti sanship in the el ectorate.
Hence if we regress Vt on Gt over a series of elections, the
regres sion l ine wil l  fit perfectly ( in the purely determini st ic case 
we are assuming here), and the sl ope w il l  be the behavioral parameter 
p. 
An al ternative possibil ity is to use a cross-section of 
individuals i in a single election t .  Noto that we can rewrite tho 
indiv idual-level rel ationship ( i) as  
vit = ai + pgit = a + pgit + ( ai - a), a + pg it + ui • 
where as  before a is tho moan or average parti sanship in the 
el ectorate, and ui = (ai - ;;) is i's parti sanship in deviation form.
In this rel ation ui loots much l ite the residual disturbance term in a
cl assical bivariate regression. If we now regress individual vote 
intentions v it on government-induced income change s git ' tho least­
squaros l ine wil l  not fit perfectly ( s ince the "residuals" ui are
nonzero), but if the usual regres sion assumptions are satisf ied by the 
underlying relationship, the slope of this cross-se ctional regression 
l ino wil l st ill be an unbiased e st imate of the parameter of interest, 
p . In the present context , the critical assumption required for this
is that the "disturbance" ui be uncorrel ated with the explanatory
variable git: if this is  so, tho cross-se ctional estimate wil l give an
accurate idea of tho true individual-level effect . If not, howover--
i. o . , if there is some correlation between income change s and parti sanship 
across individuals--thon tho est imate wil l  be biased to some degree. 
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Unfortunately, however, all this is  irrelevant to the real 
inference problem we face , since in practice we would be unable to 
observe the proper explanatory variabl e git (or Gt) directly. What we
can observe, instead, are the ne t changes in voters ' total incomes .  
But while these are affected to some degree by governmental 
act iv ities, they are also influenced by a variety of extraneous or 
idiosyncratic factors, which operate quite independently of the 
act iv ities of the incumbent administration. Among these exogenous 
factors wil l  be some macro-level events whose effect s are widespread 
throughout tho economy ( or el ectorate), such as OPEC-induced shocks in 
energy suppl ies and prices ,  maj or natural disasters, and the l ike. 
Many of the relevant factors are much more l ocal ized or personalized 
in impact , however, and wil l  largely cancel each other out at tho 
aggregate l evel . For exampl e, local variations in weather patterns 
may seriously affect tho incomes of farmers or ski-l ift operators in 
certain geographic areas, but normally wil l be of only minor 
importance for the economy at l argo ; tho same wil l be true for 
sectoral change s  in the economy, with losses in decl ining industries 
or regions be ing largely offset by gains in growth industries or 
areas. At a more individual istic level , life-cycle differences wil l 
be a maj or source of variation in individual income changes: for 
example ,  younger workers entering their most product ive years wil l  
usually enj oy above-average income gains irrespective of macroeconomic 
condi tions (because of upward j ob mobil ity, mandated seniority-related 
sal ary rai se s, and the l ite), while older or retiring workers 
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typically ge t below-average increase s, The addition or departure of a 
dependent child w il l  have a maj or effect on a household ' s f inancial 
wel lbeing, and individual-level windfal l events ( inheritance or gifts, 
casual ty losses from fire or accident, etc.) wil l also pl ay a role. 
All of those factors produce considerable cross-se ctional variation in 
individual income changes, The not effect at the aggregate l evel wil l 
be much smal ler, however, because of tho cancellation of offse tting 
ef f octs 
Lot eit be the not change in i ' s  income during period t
re sul ting from all these extraneous (and pol itically irrelevant) 
factors, and git be the government-induced change , as before, Then
the observable variable yit ' the no t change in i's total income, wil l
be given by 
( i i) Yit = gi t  + eit'
The behavioral rel ation ( i) we are trying to e stimate involves only 
the government-induced component, but since ne ither it or the 
idiosyncratic component eit is observable, we must work instead with
the "contaminated" variable y it. This gives rise to some serious
est imation problems, to which we now turn. 
3 .  THE AGGREGATE-DATA TIME-SERIES ESTIMATE 
To obtain the time-series est imate we form the aggregate-level 
variables Vt, the aggregate vote in el ect ion t, and Yt = l/n 2= i yit '
the change per-capita income over the period preceeding the el ect ion. 
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Since yit =git + eit ( from ( ii)), the aggregate-level variable Yt can
be simil arly decomposed into government-induced and exogenous 
components :  Yt = l/n 2= i( git + eit) = Gt + Et , where Gt i s  the mean
(or per-capita) government-induced income change and Et is the mean
exogenous change, In analyzing the aggregate data we fit a regression 
l ine of the 
elect ions, 
TS TS form a + b Yt to the (Vt ,Yt) points  over a series of T
TS Tho t ime-series regression coefficient b is then our
est imate of the underlying behavioral parameter p, It is shown in the 
Appendix ( l ine 20), that this est imate will in general be rel ated to 
the true coefficient value as fol lows : 
( i i i) bTS 
TS cov ( Gt,Yt) 
p TS var (Yt)
TS TS 
[ 
vu (�) + cov (�,�) J p TS TS TS ' var ( Gt) + 2cov (Gt,Et) + var (Et) 
where varTS, covTS are sample variances and covariances of the
aggregate- level variables in que stion, over the T elections. Since 
the quantity in square brackets is not unity, in general the est imate 
wil l  be biased; the magnitude of tho bias depends on the various 
variances and covariances involved. 
Let us now try to get some sense of their probable magnitude s .  
Gt is the change in  per-capita income arising from government
activities. It should be noted that this quantity depends only 
indirectly on the level of government spending as such : for example, 
to take an extreme case , if al l government expenditure were for purely 
redistributive direct income transfers, then the individual-l evel 
gains of recipient s (git > 0) would precisely offset the losses of the
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"donors" ( git< 0) , so at the aggregate level the ne t change Gt would 
be precisely zero, irrespective of the level of spending . However, if 
this  redistribut ion involves some deadweight l oss to the economy--due 
to direct administrative co st s and waste, or to indirect efficiency 
loases resul ting from incentive distortions and the l ike--then Gt 
would be negative (and the magnitude of this deadweight loss wil l  
presumably vary with the level of spending). On the other hand, much 
of government expenditure is  for the provision of publ ic goods and 
service s ,  rather than for direct income transfers as such, and to the 
extent that such expenditure is productive ( in the sense of providing 
valued goods and services which would be underproduced, or produced 
l e s s  efficiently, by the private sector) the aggregate income 
increment resul ting from such programs wil l be positive (and 
presumably wil l al so vary with the level of expenditure). Since the 
deadweight l osses and efficiency gains work in opposite direct ions, 
they tend to cancel each other, Koreover continuing mul ti-year 
programs and mandated expenditure requirements create great inertia in 
spending level s, and permit them to respond only slowly, and only with 
considerable l ag, to exogenous economic fluctuations, Hence, al l 
things considered, these spending-level effects are unl ikely to 
contribute signif icantly to the variance of Gt, or to produce any 
sizable correlation between Gt and Et. 
The important variations in Gt are thus not tied directly to 
the l evel of expenditure ,  but arise from quite different source s. One 
important factor, particul arly in recent times, is macroeconomic 
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pol icy. Thus , if government expenditures are maintained or increased 
during economic downturns (negative Et) de spite fal l ing tax revenues ,  
this w il l  create a positive Gt, both directly ( the gains of recipients 
or consumers of government programs wil l not be ful ly offse t by the 
l osses of the taxpaying "donors") and indirectly, because of the 
effects on the level of economic activity. Thus , to the extent that 
conscious macroeconomic pol icy or "buil t- in stabil izers" attempt to 
compensate for exogenous economic fluctuations, Gt wil l tend to  be 
somewhat negatively correlated with Et. Other factors which produce 
important fluctuations in Gt operate in a less systematic manner, 
These include foreign pol icy developments (grain embargos, negotiation 
of new trade agreements) which have important economic ramifications, 
and intended or unintended macro-level consequences of domestic 
pol icies in various areas (e . g .  safety or environmental legisl ation; 
attempts to intervene in behalf of specific sectors, such as farmers 
or auto workers; attempt s to control or decontrol energy price s or 
wage settlements; and so on). Developments of this kind are typical ly 
responses to specif ic pressures or pol icy problems, not directly 
rel ated to macroeconomic targets ;  hence , in the l ong run, over several 
administrations and business  cycles, their effect s are probably 
largely uncorrel ated with short-term exogenous economic fluctuations. 
On bal ance, then, we should expect Gt to be l argely 
uncorrelated, or perhaps somewhat negatively correlated, with the 
exogenous term Et. Moreover, since the government-induced effect Gt 
may be a sizeable quant ity, given energetic economic management or 
mismanagement , its variance is probably comparable in magnitude to 
10that of Et' 
To see what this means for the bias i.n the time-series 
est imate, first consider the simpler case in which Et and Gt are
completely uncorrelated over the sample period. Then the expression 
( i i i) reduces to: 
bTS
TS [ var ( Gt) JII TS TS var ( Gt) + var (Et)
[ varTS(Gt) JII TS var (Yt) 
TS (since cov ( Gt, Et) = 0), The quantity in square brackets is the 
proportion of vari ance of per-capita income changes arising from 
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government-induced changes, Since this proportion necessarily l ies 
TS between zero and one , b wil l l ie between zero and the true value II· 
The est imate w ill therefore be of the correct sign, but will somewhat 
understate the true effect . The degree of understatement depends on 
the proportion of total variance contr ibuted by the government-induced 
effects: if they account for hal f the total, for example, the 
estimate wil l  be hal f the correct value ,  II·
In the more general case, Gt and Et may be somewhat negatively
correlated be cause of compensatory macroeconomic pol icies, Let us 
suppose, in this case , that Gt consists of two components , an
uncorrelated component Ut ( for which cov (Ut ,Et) = 0) and a
countercycl ical component Ct' which compensates or offse ts some
portion n of the exogenous income change Et. Thus Ct = - nEt' and
Gt = Ut + Ct = Ut - nEt. It is then straightforward to show that
bTS
[ varTS(Ut)II 
varTS(Ut)
TS + n (l - n)var (Et) J2 TS + ( 1  - n) var (Et) 
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Since the numerator and denominator are both positive for any n. the 
estimate is of the correct sign, Moreover, since n(l - n) < (1 - n)2
for values of n in the pl aus ible range 0 < n < 1/2 ,  the quant i ty in 
square brackets wil l be less than unity, so the estimate wil l, again, 
be somewhat attenuated, To pick some typical values, if n = 1/4 and 
the variances of Ut and Et are approximately equal, we wil l  have
bTS 
case, 
19/25 II• which is rather less attenuation than in the previous
TS I As n decreases the attenuation increases, with b = 1 2 II in
the l imiting case of n = O; conversely the attenuation diminishes as n 
increases (the est imate would actually exaggerate the true effect for 
the unl ikely case in which n exceeded 1/2). 
In summary, then, we should expect the aggregate time-series 
est imate to be of the correct sign, though probably somewhat 
attenuated in magnitude . The attenuation is not overwhelming, 
however, and bTS should give a reasonable order-of-magnitude est imate
of the true value of II; a sizable estimate is a val id indication of a 
(probably st i l l  l arger) real effect in the underlying behavioral 
rel ation. 
4 .  THE INDIVIDUAL-LEVFL CROSS-SECTIONAL E'.>TIMATE 
We now choose a fixed elect ion t ,  and regress individual votes 
vit on income changes yit = git + eit across the n individuals .  It is
shown in the Appendix ( line 21) that the cross-sectional regression 
coefficient bes will then be: 
(iva) 
( ivb) 
cs< y > COY git' it + bes = p cs< > var Y it 
cs 
COY (ai,yit
) 
cs var (yit) 
cs cs 
[ var (git) + cov (git' eit) ]p cs cs cs , var (git) + 2cov (git' eit) + var (eit) 
{ . � � }
var (a.,git) + var (ai,eit) + cs cs cs • var (git) + 2cov (git' eit) + var (eit) 
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Here varcs. coves denote cross-sectional variances and covariances of 
individual-level variabl es, which in general are quite different from 
the time-series variances and covariances of the corresponding 
aggregate-level variabl es, In particular, the idiosyncratic component 
will be the major source of the cross-sectional variance in individual 
incomes, and the government-induced component will play a much smaller 
role. 
To see what this means for the estimate, first consider the 
l imiting case in which government policies affect only macroeconomic 
variables, and do not change the pattern of incidence at all. Then 
the government-induced effect will be the same for all voters, i. e. , 
git = Gt for all i, so the variance var(g) and covariances cov(g,e) 
and cov(g,a) will be all the zero (here, and henceforth in this 
section, we omit the CS superscripts and it subscripts when no 
ambiguity wil l result). The expression (vib) then reduces to: 
bCS= P [ O + O  ] + { O + cov(a,e) }=cov(a,e) 
0 + 2 ' 0 + var(e) 0 + 2 • 0 + var(e) var(e) 
Thus the estimate does not depend on the true value P at al l! It is 
compl etely determined by a spurious term, which concerns the quite 
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irrelevant correlation between exogenous individual income changes and 
partisan predispositions. Clearl y, in this case, the cross-sectional 
estimate will tell us nothing whatever about the underlying behavioral 
rel ationship of interest. 
More general ly, even if there is some variation in git across 
individuals, its variance wil l still be smal l relative to that of the 
idiosyncratic component, g may be correl ated to some extent with e in 
this case, but the correlation is probably very weak: empirical 
studies of incidence (in the US, at least) typically find that the net 
incidence of government spending is more or l ess uniform 
(proportionately) across income classes and that the pattern does not 
change much over time. 11 Hence cov(g,e) is probabl y small relative to 
the other variance terms involved. If for simplicity we take it to be 
zero, then cov(g,y) = var(g), so the expression (iva) reduces to: 
(va) b cs - p [.Y.Uhl] + !.'. :,. � - var(y) v:.r(y) 
Since var(e ) is large relative to var(g), the P term will be 
heavily attenuated, and the second spurious term wil l still have 
considerable effect on the estimate. To assess this effect, we first 
rewrite things in terms of more familiar sample statistics, The 
sample correlation between 
coy(a,y) 
var(y) r ay 
/var(a) = var(y) 
coy(a . y) a and y is r = / ( ) ( ) , so ay var a var y 
s a r S-• where S and S are the sample ay y a y 
standard deviations of a and y. Hence (va) can be rewritten as 
(vb) bes 
Sa [ll!'.hl] + r s • P var(y) ay Y 
Let us now make the fol l owing il lustrative quantitative 
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assumptions: suppose that the distribution of individual-level income 
changes, measured in percentage form, has a standard deviation of 
1 2  around S percentage points. Let votes and partisanship be scaled 
from 0 to 100, and suppose that the distribution of partisanship 
13 (i. e. , of a) has a standard deviation of 2S points. Further suppose 
that the government-induced component g accounts for 10 percent of the 
variance of individual income changes, and that the true value of p is 
. S  (so that, at the aggregate l evel , a 10 percent government-induced 
change in per-capita income woul d produce a S percent shift in votes). 
Under these assumptions, (viib) becomes: 
bCS  = . S(.10) + r �S = .O S + S ay r ay 
Cl earl y the real effect is essential l y  washed out, and the estimate 
depends primaril y on the second, spurious term. Al though individual 
income changes are unl ikel y to be highl y correl ated with partisanship, 
some weak accidental correl ation is surel y inevitable. Even if r ay 
never exceeded . O S in magnitude--a very modest range--the spurious 
term coul d then range from - . 2S to + . 2 S, and thus woul d dominate the 
estimate. 
Moreover, there is good reason to bel ieve that the r ay 
correl ation probabl y varies in both magnitude and sign from el ection 
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to el ection. Economic upturns tend to redistribute incomea downward, 
and thus to disproportionatel y benefit l ow-income Democrats: hence we 
might wel l expect to find r > O in boom-year el ections under ay 
Democratic administrations, or r < 0 under Republ ican incumbents. ay 
Recession-year el ections shoul d reverse these, since incomes then tend 
to be redistributed upward. To the extent that these and other 
cs effects do cause r to vary, the cross-sectional estimates b ay 
obtained in different el ections wil l be quite unstabl e and 
inconsistent, in both magnitude and sign. 
Different assumptions might improve things somewhat, but not 
enough to change tho basic concl usion. For exampl e, to make things 
more favorabl e  for the cross-sectional approach, let us change the 
above assumptions ss fol l ows: suppose that the government-induced 
component accounts for 2S percent of tho variance in individual income 
changes. Moreover, suppose we introduce some specific measures of 
partisanship, or other control variabl es, to reduce the effect of the 
spurious term. Of course these control s wil l not be perfect, so there 
wil l  stil l be an unmeasured partisanship component which enters into 
the cov(a,y) term. Let us be quite optimistic, however, and suppose 
that our control s succeed in accounting for hal f the variance of 
partisanship. The unmeasured a component wil l  then represent SO 
percent of the total variance, so its standard deviation woul d then be 
,;-:50c2s) = 17. S. Putting these assumptions into (vb), we find that: 
bes = .s < .2s> + r ay � = . 12S + 3. S s r ay 
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Cl earl y we are stil l seriousl y underestimating the true effect 
( fl  = .S). Moreover since the spurious 3.S r term is of the same ay 
order of magnitude as the first term, it wil l stil l have a major 
effect on the estimate, and wil l stil l create instabil ity ( and 
occasional sign reversal s, when r gets negative enough) in the ay 
cross-sectional estimates obtained from different el ections. 
Moreover, because the bias arising from the r term is additive ay 
rather than mul tipl icative, it is not feasibl e to try to improve the 
estimate by simpl y correcting for the attenuation of the first term. 
Tabl e 1 bel ow summarizes the resul ts of simil ar cal cul ations 
as the two critical quantities, var( g)/var( y) and var( a), are varied 
from pl ausibl e through unreal istical l y  extreme values. Onl y in the 
impl ausibl e "extreme, extreme" case at the l ower right hand corner do 
we get a reasonabl y stabl e estimate of fl, and even there the midrange 
val ue, bes = . 25, is a considerabl e underestimate. In every other 
case the snurious ray term is comparable in magnitude to the II term, 
so the estimates wil l be unstabl e and inconsistent in both magnitude 
[Tabl e 1 about here] 
and sign. The concl usion therefore seems cl ear: under any real istic 
view of the probabl e empirical magnitudes at work here, the estimates 
obtained by regressing individual votes on changes in personal 
wel l being is essential l y  unrel ated to the real effect of interest. 
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S. SOCIOTROPIC VOTING 
The anal ysis so far has proceeded on the basis of the 
behavioral rel ationship ( i). According to this specification, voter 
i's vote depends directl y on git' the government- induced change in his 
personal real income during period t. Whil e this can be interpreted 
in different ways--e. g. , it may be that voter i regards git as a 
" signal " of the overal l success of government's economic pol icies in 
improving the general wel fare--cl earl y the simpl est and most obvious 
interpretation is simpl y that voter i is acting in terms of his own 
personal sel f-interest, narrowl y defined. In contrast to this 
somewhat egoistic or sel fishl y motivated type of voter, we can also 
consider the possibility of other-regarding or sociotropic voters. As 
Kinder and Kiewiet, for exampl e, picture him, 
the prototypic sociotropic voter is influenced most 
of al l by the nation's economic condition. Purel y sociotropic 
citizens vote according to the country's pocketbook, not their 
own. Thus the party in power suffers in the pol ls during hard 
times because voters act on their negative assessments of 
national economic conditions--quite apart from the trials and 
ribul ations of their own l ives. 
• The sociotropic voter asks pol itical l eaders not 
" What have you done for .!!!!!. l:fil y?" but rather " What have you 
done for the country latel y? 
After reviewing findings of other studies and perf oming their 
own analysis, they concl ude that U. S.  voters, at l east, do behave 
sociotropical l y, and respond hardl y at al l to sel f- interested 
" pocketbook" considerations. 
To examine the evidence on sociotropic voting, we must first 
formally characterize sociotropic behavior. A sociotropic voter is 
one who responds, not to changes in his own personal economic 
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wellbeing, but rather to changes in aggregate or collective wellbeing. 
A natural and obvious measure of such collective improvement is 
Gt = l/n [: i git' the government-induced change in average or per 
capita real income. If we take this as the relevant sociotropic 
index, a sociotropic voter is then one whose behavior is governed by a 
relationship such as 
(vi) vit = ai + P 2 Gt ' 
instead of the "self-interested" relation in (i). In (vi), p2 is the 
true "sociotropic" parameter, to be distinguished from the self-
interest parameter considered so far (to avoid ambiguity we henceforth 
denote the self-interest effect--p of (i)�by p1).
Let us now see how the estimates considered in the previous 
two sections would be affected if voters actually behaved 
sociotropically. At the aggregate level, if we again regress the 
aggregate vote Vt on Yt, resulting time-series estimate will be 
(vii) bTS 
TS cov (Gt'Yt) P 2 TS var (Yt) 
(Appendix, line 27). This is essentially identical to (iiia), except 
that it now involves the sociotropic coefficient p2, in place of the 
earlier self-interest parameter. From the discussion and 
considerations of section 3, we should therefore expect the aggregate 
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analysis to yield a good, if somewhat attenuated, estimate of the real 
(in this case sociotropic) effect. 
The individual-level cross-sectional regression of votes vit 
on changes in personal wellbeing yit should not be expected to yield a 
good estimate of the true sociotropic effect, p2, since it involves 
the "wrong• explanatory variable, personal wellbeing. Ideally, in 
fact, we might hope that the estimate will be zero, since sociotropic 
voters do not in fact respond at all to personal considerations. As 
it turns out (Appendix, line (28)) the cross-sectional estimate is 
(viii) bes= 
cs cov (ai,yit) 
cs var (yit) 
s 
r ....!l ay S y 
Thus, as expected, bes does not depend on the true sociotropic effect, 
P 2; however, the estimated effect is not necessarily zero, for it 
still involves the spurious r term encountered in the previous ay 
section. As shown there, under plausible data ass1111ptions the ray 
term dominates the estimate even under the "self-interested" 
hypothesis (i), so the behavior of the estimate is essentially 
identical under either hypothesis: we should expect generally weak, 
somewhat Wistable estimates, with occasional sign reversals, in either 
case. The personal wellbeing estimates simply do not discriminate 
between the sociotropic and self-interest hypotheses. 
The more persuasive evidence for sociotropic voting lies not 
in the nonfindings concerning the role of personal economic 
circumstances, however, but rather in the further finding, common to 
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several studies, to the effect that individual voting decisions are 
positively and consistently related to " sociotropic judgments" of 
various kinds. These self-reported judgments include individuals' 
assessments of how successfully the government is handling economic 
problems, or of which party is more competent in economic affairs, and 
their perceptions of current trends in general business conditions. 
These measures all perform similarly, and the differences between them 
are not important for present purposes. Hence we consider a typical 
performance measure, which we ass11111e can be represented as a 
continuous or scaled variable, and denote by pit voter i's assessment 
of the government's sociotropic performance in managing the economy in 
period t. To investigate the relation between these performance 
judgments and voting, we do a cross-sectional regression of the form 
vit =a +  bppit + error; bp is then the estimated sociotropic effect. 
If we still assume the electorate is composed entirely of 
sociotropic voters who behave according to the sociotropic 
relationship (vi), then (Appendix, line (35)) the estimate will be 
related to the underlying model parameters as follows: 
(ix) b p 
cs ) cov (vit, pit 
cs ) var (pit 
cs cov (ai, pit) 
cs var (pit) 
s 
r .....!!. ap S p 
Thus, interestingly, the estimated sociotropic effect b does not p 
depend on the true sociotropic parameter �2 at all! 
This is, on reflection, not really so surprising. Since we 
are ultimately interested in real sociotropic effects--i.e. , in the 
effect of the government's actual economic performance on votes--the 
validity of the estimate will depend critically on the relationship 
between the government's actual soc.; ou:opic performance, Gt, and 
voters' sociotropic perceptions, pit• Define uit = pit - Gt as the
discrepancy between perception and reality. Then, equivalently, 
Pit = Gt + uit' so we can think of the explanitory variable pit as 
being composed of two parts, a "real" component Gt, and perceptual 
"noise" or error, uit" If we now aggregate over individuals, then
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Pt = l/n L i pit= l/n L i(Gt + uit) =Gt + ;t, where ;t = 1/n L i uit
is the sample mean of the perceptual errors. From this it follows 
that (pit - Pt)= (uit - ;t). This implies that the cross-sectional
variance and all covariances involving the performance rating variable 
pit depend only on perceptual noise, and not at all on the real
sociotropic measure, Gt. Since the cross-sectional estimate is a 
function solely on these variances and covariances (cf. (ix) above), 
it is not surprising that it therefore completely misses any actual 
sociotropic effect which may be present. 
The estimate does depend, however, on another term involving 
rap' the correlation between individual partisanship and performance 
ratings. This term is also spurious in relation to the real effect we 
are trying to estimate, but is rather different in nature from the 
somewhat analogous spurious income-partisanship r term encountered ay 
earlier. In the present case the term involves the correlation 
between voters' partisanship and their perceptions of government 
performance (or actually, as noted above, the errors in such 
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perceptions) ; it is thus a reflection of perceptual bias, or an 
inverse measure of cognitive dissonance. There is abundent evidence15 
to the effect that such biases are present, and generally operate so 
as to reduce dissonance by bringing perceptions into accordance with 
partisan preferences. Hence, in contrast to the weak and unstable r ay 
term encountered earlier in the "personal wellbeing• regressions, we 
should expect the present rap term to be consistently positive. (As
before, to the extent that better explicit controls on partisanship 
reduce S a• the spurious term would be lessened in magnitude; in the 
present case, however, this would simply drive the estimate toward 
z ero, and would not improve it as an estimate of p2. )  Thus we should 
expect b to be positive, and probably siz eable. Clearly, however, p 
this estimate is artifactual, and does not demonstrate any real 
sociotropic effect. 
Let us now consider the situation under the alternative 
hypotheses of self-interested voting. When all voters act according 
to the self-interested relationship (i) , the sociotropic estimate is 
(x) b p 
cs cs cov (pit' git) cov (ai,pi t ) P 1 cs + cs var (pit) var (pit) 
s 
P 1r ....& + pg s p 
s 
r ...S ap S p 
(Appendix, 1 ine ( 34) ) • The second term is the same "cognitive 
dissonance" factor appearing in (ix) above. In addition, however, we 
now have another term involving the true (sel f-interest) coefficient 
p1• The magnitude and sign of this first term depends on the
correlation rpg between individual performance assessments pit and
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government-induced changes in personal wellbeing, git• If the two are 
uncorrelated, the p1 term drops out, and (x) becomes identical to 
(ix) . On the other hand, to the extent that individuals do 
extrapolate or project their own experiences with the effects 
government policies onto the economy at large, we might expect some 
positive correlation between git and individual performance ratings 
pit• To this extent this is so the expression (x) will be somewhat 
larger than (ix) . This implies that the estimate will be somewhat 
larger under the self-interest hypothes i s  than in the sociotropic 
case; thus, if anything, a large performance-rating estimate b should p 
be taken as evidence for self-interested rather than sociotropic 
voting ! (In practice, the p1 term woul d likely be small relative to 
the rap term, however, so again the realistic conclusion is that the 
cross-sectional estimate is simply unable to discriminate between the 
h ypotheses. ) 
Though we have considered only the polar extremes of purely 
self-interested or purely sociotropic voting, and have looked only at 
simple bivariate regressions using the two explanatory variables, our 
conclusions apply quite generally. In particular, suppose we specify 
a generaliz ed model of the form 
(xii) vit = ai + plgit + P 26t 
which incorporates both self-interest and sociotropic effects, and 
then to attempt to estimate p1 and p2 simul taneously with a multiple 
regression of v it on Yit and Pit• 
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Boforo considering tho mul tiplo-rogrossion e st imates lot us 
note in passing how tho various bivariate regressions considered above 
would perform under tho more gonoral spocif ication (xii) above. 
First , in tho time-series regression of Vt on changes in per capita
income Yt , tho e st imate is
(xiii) bTS < P1 + P2>
TS cov ( Gt'Yt) 
vsrTS (Yt )
(Appendix, l ine (31 ) ) . This i s  closely akin to ( iiia) and (vii) , 
except that it now involves both sel f- interest and sociotropic 
offoct s . Thus wo should expect tho aggregate analysis to yield s 
roasonsblo, if somewhat attenuated, est imate of the overall no t 
effect ; it is  not possible  to disentangle tho separate self-interest 
and sociotropic coeff ic ient s with this kind of analysis, however. In 
tho individual- level cross-se ctional analysis ( and omitting tho CS 
superscript s and it subscript s ) , tho regression of votes on personal 
wel lbe ing yields an e st imate of tho form 
(xiv) b _ p coy(g,y) + coy(q,y) y - 1 var( y) var( y) '
(Appendix, l ine (32) ) , while regressing votes on individual 
performance ratings g ives 
(xv) b p 
p cov(g,p) + cov(a,p) 1 var(p ) var(p ) 
(Appendix, fol lowing l ine ( 35) ) .  Those expressions are identical to 
( iv) and (x) re spe ctively , which obtain under the pure sel f- interest 
hypothesis, so once again the estimates wil l  entirely miss any real 
sociotropic offoct p2 which may be present ,  and will also fail to
yield a meaningful estimate of the sel f- interest effect , because of 
the heavy attenuation of the p1 term.
Now consider a mul tiple regression of the form 
v it = a + by.pYit + bp .�it + error.
Hero b and b are now tho mul tipl e regression estimates of the y .p p .y  
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effects of  personal wellbeing and sociotropic j udgments (as dist inct 
from tho corresponding bivariate estimates, b and b , consideredy p 
above) . From tho normal equations for this regression it fol lows that 
(xvi) b p .y
s 
b - b r -l!. p y.p yp s y 
(Appendix, l ine (38 ) ) . Thus tho mul tipl e-regression est imate i s  equal 
to the bivariate e stimate, minus a corr••ction factor which depends on 
various sample quantities. Resul ts reported by Kinder and Kiow iot  
show tho sample correlation botwoon sociotropic j udgments and personal 
wel lbe ing to bo quite small ( tho partial correlations run from nil to 
. 13 ) , while  the mul tipl e regression estimate of the personal wel lbeing 
offoct is  oven smal ler.16 Since S and S aro of roughly similarp y 
msgnitude s ,17 tho correction factor wil l bo tho product of two qui te
smal l numbers and one which is close to unity (or at least not 
overwhelmingly large) . Hence, at least for this data, b wil l bo p.y 
very close to the bivariate estimate b , so our various f indings andp 
conclus ions concerning b also apply to the mul tiple regressionp 
estimate b • The same will be true for b and b • P • Y Y Y• P 
Table 2 below summarizes the main facts concerning the 
relationship between the regression estimates (whether bivariate or 
multiple) and the model parameters, under the various behavioral 
hypotheses considered. 
[Table 2 about here] 
S everal conclusions seem clear. The individual-level cross-
sectional analysis yields poor estimates in every case. They 
completely miss any sociotropic effect that may be present; the 
sizeable and apparently stable "performance rating" estimates are 
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largely reflections of the spurious "cognitive dissonance" correlation 
between ratings and partisan predispositions, and do not depend on any 
true sociotropic effect p2 at all. While the personal wellbeing 
estimates do depend to some degree on p1 , the dependence is a very
weak one; in practice the behavior of these estimates will depend 
mainly on the spurious a, y term, in every case. In contrast to these 
essentially spurious cross-sectional estimates, the aggregate- level 
estimate is reasonably successful in estimating the net effect of 
economic circumstances on voting behavior. It cannot separate out the 
self-interest and sociotropic effects, however; only the net < P1 + p2) 
effect is identified. Because of this, and because all the cross-
sectional estimates behave essentially identically under all three 
hypotheses, it is clear that none of this evidence effectiv ely 
discriminates between the various behavioral hypotheses. There is 
simply no way of determining whether the observable relationships 
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be tween economic variables and voting were ultimately generated by 
sociotropic or self-interested behavior, or by some combination of the 
two, on the basis of this kind of evidence. 
This is not to say that the distinction between sociotropic 
and self-interested voting is necessarily meaningless or undecideable 
with respect to other kinds of evidence, however. The individual-
level estimation problems described above arise essentially from 
measurement error. On the other hand aggregation at t ho economy-wide 
lev el, while circumventing many of these problems, nevertheless makes 
it impossible to dist inguish self-interest from sociotropic behavior, 
since they always operate in tandem at the aggregate level. One 
possible solution, howev er, might be to aggregate to some intermediate 
lev el, at which self- interest and sociotropic considerations diverge, 
which would make it possible to separate out and identify the two 
e ffects. Thus, for example, in an election in which free trade vs. 
protectionism become an important issue, we would be particularly 
interested in examini ng the behavior of groups or regions suffering 
from import compe titi on. The net social gains from trade are both 
siz eable and positive ( Gt > 0) , but while the benefits are rather 
diffusely distributed to consumers at large, the costs tend to fall 
disproportionately on those inv olved in uncompe titiv e domestic 
industrie s. Such persons provide a c l :· case in which altruism and 
se lf- int e rest diverge ,  and their response should thus yield a good 
test of the sociotropic hypot hesis. Such a test certainly seems 
feasible: indeed, we alre ady have conside rable casual empirical 
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evidence on groups s uch as aut o or st eel workers threatened by for eign 
imports,  or farmer s s t uc k  with large stocks of unsol d gr ain because of 
a foreign polic y decision t o  embargo grain export s .  
It seems likely that a c areful analysis of the vot ing pat terns 
of such groups would reveal that self- int erest ,  even at the expense of 
the general welfar e, has not disappeared a s  a signific ant fac t or in 
contempor ary U. S. politic s .  This is not to say that only self­
int erest is important , or that there are not t imes and places in which 
citizens may indeed be willing to endure consider able personal 
sacrifices for the sake of broader social ends . But a picture of the 
U.S.  vot er as always ac ting in this fashion, and never being moved by 
per sonal or par ochial int eres t s ,  is sur ely overdrawn: the broad facts  
of recent hist orical experience point different ly.
Ther e is a variant of the sociotropism hypothesis which is not 
so easily falsified. One might argue, for example, that an aut o 
worker who vot es for a protect ionist candidat e may st ill be voting 
sociotropically with respect t o  his fellow worker s, if not the nation 
at large, since protect ion helps all aut o worker s, and not simpl y the 
voter in quest ion. Thus , in this vein, we could broaden the 
definition of soc iotr opism to allow the sc ope of sociotr opic concern 
to apply to groups or collect ivities smaller than the society at 
lar ge, though st ill larger than the individual himself. 
This reformulat ion, however, reduces the hypothesis to a near-­
tautol ogy, and makes the dist inct ion between self- interested and 
sociotr opic voting an es sentiall y empirical ly meaningles s one, with 
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respect to nearly any imaginable kind of evidence. In a modern mass 
democrac y, most individuals never receive, or expect to receive, 
purely per sonal favor s or benefits from office holder s .  Even the most 
self- int erest ed of vot er s will therefore not j udge candidates in terms 
of such individual benefits, but will instead favor candidat es whose 
polic y positions and actions have benefited him, individual l y--which 
is quite a different thing. Since public policies by definition 
al ways affect aggregates of individuals, any such vot er will always be 
able to find a c oa lit ion of others who have similar int erests. We are 
then faced with the following quest ion : does the vot er in quest ion 
favor the c andidate because of genuine altr uist ic concern for the 
welfare of those other s who have been similarly affected by the 
candidate's activities and polices? Or is he inst ead purely but 
realist ically self-int erested, and democr at enough to rationalize, 
perhaps even t o  himself, his per sonal concerns in terms of group 
interest s and fellow- feeling? The quest ion is not quite an 
empirical ly meaningless one, but it comes very close. Surel y it woul d 
be exceedingly difficult to devise an empirical test of it . 
It seems c lear from this that the task of meaningful ly 
dist inguishing between and measuring the respect ive impacts of self­
interest and altruism in cont emporary elector al politics is a subt le 
and difficult one, and that in addition to the methodologic al problems 
reviewed above, there are also serious conceptual and theoretical 
issues which wil l fir st have to be addressed and resol ved before 
meaningful empiric al research on the quest ion will be possibl e. 
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TABLE l 
PREDICTED CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTIMATES AS A FUNCTION OF 
VAR(G) /VAR(Y) AND OF UNEXPLAINED VARIANCE IN a 
Assumpt ions : var(a) • 25 , of which 0, 51% or 84% is explicitly controlled ; 
var(y) • 52 , of which var(g) constitutes 10%, 25% or 50% . 
var (g) 
var(y) 
Low 10% 
High 25% 
Extreme 50% 
Range of bes 
(r • ± .05) 
None 
0% 
. l B  ± 5r 
. 258 ± 5r 
.58 ± 5r 
± . 25 
Degree of Control 
on Part isanship 
Good 
51% 
. IS ± 3 . 5r 
. 25S ± 3 . 5r 
. 5 6  ± 3 . 5r 
± . 1 8  
TABLE 2 
Extreme 
84% 
.1e ± 2r 
. 258 ± 2r 
. 5 8  ± 2r 
± . 10 
Mean of bes 
ce - . 5> 
.05 
. 1 25 
. 2 5  
EVIDENCE AND INFERENCES UNDER ALTERNATIVE BEHAVIORAL HYPOTHESES 
Aggregate 
Time-Series: 
yt 
Evidence : 
Croes-Sectional , Using 
Personal Wellbeing : 
y i t
Perforunce Rat ings : 
pit 
Self-Interested 
Voters: (1) 8 
cov(G,Y) 
1 var(Y) 81 
c::�f;f + c�=!�;J> 8 � + �1 var(p) var(p) 
Sociotropic 
Voters: (vi) 
Both: (:xii) 
Comnent : 
S cov(G,Y) 2 var(Y) -
(S + S ) cov(G,Y) 1 2 var (Y) 
Indist inguishab l e ,  since 
estimate is positive and 
sizeable in all cases. 
Related t o  real effect, 
but unable to dbentangle 
81 and 82 . 
� 
var(y) 
s � . �l var(y) var(y) 
Indist inguishable ,  since 
el term is heav ily 
ettenuated and a term 
dominates . Estimates 
•&a.1 1 ,  unstable ,  and 
essentially unrelated to 
true B 's  in every case. 
cov(a: ,p) 
var (p) 
B � + �1 var(p) var(p) 
Probably indistinguishabl e •  
•ince el term small relative 
to a tenn. Estimate sizeabl e ,  
posit ive , but essentially 
unrelated to true S ' s ,  in 
every case . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  Notably Rob inson ( 1 95 0 ) , plus innumbe r ab l e  subsequent artic l e s ,  
monographs ,  and volume s .  
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2 .  E. g . , among othe r s ,  Kramer ( 1971 ) , Kramer and Lepper ( 1972 ) , 
Stigler ( 1 973 ) , Lepper ( 1974) , Tuf te ( 197 5 ) , Arc e l us and Mel tzer 
( 197 5 ) , Bloom and Price ( 197 5 ) , Goodman and Kramer ( 1975) , Fa i r  
( 1 97 8) . 
3 .  E. g . ,  Logan ( 1 977 ) , Fiorina ( 1 97 8 ) , Kinder and Kiew ie t ( 1 97 9 a ,  
1 97 9b ) . A few st udies of Pre s idential vot ing have produced l e s s  
nihil i s t i c  f inding s ,  e . g . , Tuf te ( 1 97 8 ) , Kiew iet ( 1 981 ) . 
4 .  Jacobson and Kerne l l  ( 1981 ) , for examp l e ,  sugge st that whi l e  
voters don ' t  a ctual ly respond t o  e conomic condi t ions ,  pol i t i c ians 
and party leade r s  b e l ieve they do, and are inspired t o  mount 
part icul arly effective campaign e f fort s  when they think e conomic 
tr ends f avor the ir party , or t o  r e t ire f rom the f ie l d  if things 
l ook unpromi s ing e conomical ly .  They argue that the aggregate­
level rel at i on be tween economic condi t ions and e l e ct or al outcomes 
is actua l ly produced by the se dif ferent i a l  c ampai gn effor t s ,  
rathe r than b y  any direct behavioral re sponse b y  vot ers t o  
e conomic condit i on s . 
They make a conv inc ing c a se for dif ferent ial e ffor t s  in 
several recent e l ect ions, and such dif ferent ial s would of course 
tend to exagge r ate or magnify whatever unde rly ing behav i oral 
effects there may be . As a sole exp l ana t ion for the aggregate-
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level f indings ,  however, it stretches credu l i ty to suppo se that 
pol i t i c i an s  and campai gn strate g i st s  could remain so per s i st ently 
mi sgu i de d  over so l ong a per i od, if in f act there were no f ire 
bene a th the smoke . 
5 .  Kinder and K i ew ie t  (197 9 a ,  1979b ) . 
6 .  Thi s  po int i s  hardly an orig inal one . Grunf eld and Gril iche s 
( 1 960 ) , for e xampl e ,  reach s imil ar conclus i ons, on rather 
dif ferent grounds (which are, however, probably al so w ide ly 
appl icable to pol itical dat a ) . 
7 .  We thus s ide step the que st ion of whe ther the relevant effects are 
incumbency-or party-oriented in direct i on :  with thi s  sampl e of 
el ect i on s ,  both are equiv al ent and ind i st inguishable . 
8 .  We should thus think of vit a s  a popul arity index or "thermometer
score" for the incumbent ; this reduce s things to a relatively 
str ai ghtf orward regre s s i on problem. Alternatively, if we w ish t o  
treat i ' s  v o t e  as a d ichotomous v ar iabl e ,  then v it c a n  be
int erpr e t e d  as the inde x in a prob i t  relat ion; voter i wil l vote 
for or against the incumbent according to whether vit l ie s  above 
or b e l ow  some thre shol d value . In this case the est imate s  would 
be more compl icated and nonl ine ar i t i e s  would make the aggregation 
a b i t  more c ompl icated, but a l l  of the main point s made above 
woul d a l so apply to this prob it interpretation. 
9 .  Thi s  b iv ar iate formul a t i on is,  once again, to simp l i fy and i s  not 
e s sent ial . Al l of our po int s coul d be made , though in more 
compl icated form, in the context of a more real istic mul tiple 
47 
regr e s sion model w i th other exp l anitory and c o ntrol vari abl e s ,  
Al ternat ively , w e  c a n  suppose that the vote and income mea sure s 
have a l ready been "pur g e d" of the effects of the se other 
v ar i ab l e s  by regr e s s i ng e ach on a l l  the control vari ab l e s  a t  an 
e arl ier st age of the a na l y s i s ;  if vit and g i t  are de f ined a s  the 
r e sidual s  from the se regr e s s i ons, then as is wel l known the 
e st imate obta ined from a b ivariate regre s s i on of v it on g i t  is
ident ical t o  tha t  which would be obt a i ne d  in a mul tiple 
regre s s i on which i nc l ud e s  the control vari ab l e s  a l ong w i th 
income , 
1 0 .  In pri nc ipl e these quant i t i e s  coul d b e  e st imated from pol icy 
s imul a t i ons w i th a macroeconomic mode l . I have not a tt empt e d  t o  
do this i n  de ta i l , but some rough calcul at i ons from re sul t s  of 
Fa ir ' s  simul ations w i th his model (Fa i r  [ 1 976] ) are consi st ent 
w i th the statements abov e .  For examp l e  the re sul t s  report e d  on 
his Tab l e  9-1 ( p ,  1 7 0 )  show that in 1 971 a de crease of •s b il l ion 
in government purcha se s  of goods and serv i c e s  ( approximately 8 
percent of the Feder al budge t )  would have reduced GNP by about 
i12 b i l l ion over a one-yea r  per i od ,  or by more than 4 percent . 
Hist or ical var i a t i ons in this and other pol icy var i ab l e s  on this 
order of magni tude are not unl ike ly, and woul d produce change s i n  
G NP  which a r e  s i z eabl e r e l a t ive to the h i s t orical U. S. grow th 
rate of 3 percent . 
1 1 . [ Referenc e ] . 
1 2 ,  In princ ipl e th i s  numb e r  i s  readily est imab l e ,  though I have been 
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unabl e  to l ocate a pub l i shed source for i t .  One rese archer who 
has worked e xt ensively with the Michigan survey of consumer 
f inanc e s  has gue sst imated it to be in the 4 to S percent r ange 
( Rachel W il l i s ,  personal communicat ion) . The l ower f igure woul d 
actua l ly strengthen the argument above . 
13 . In recent years the d i s t r ibut ion of party ident i f i c a t i on, a rough 
proxy for ai , is roughly uniform, though skewed somewhat in f avor 
of the democrat s .  If the distribut ion were pe rfectly un i f orm, 
and scal ed from 0 to 1 00 ,  the st andard dev i a t i on woul d be about 
2 9  point s .  The figure g iven above i s  a rough-and-ready 
adjustment from that . As shown in Tab l e  1 be l ow ,  our conc l u s i ons 
are insens i t ive to w ide downward rev i s i ons of th i s  quant i ty .  
1 4 .  Kinder and Kiew iet (1979a) , pp . 13 2 ,  156 . 
IS . E. g . , Tufte ( 1 978) , Tab l e  S-8 ,  p. 1 3 2 . Simil arly , Tab l e  2 ,  p .  
1 06 2  of Markus and Conver se ( 1 979)  shows voter percept i on s  of 
candida t e s '  is sue pos i t i on s  are systema t i c a l ly rel ated t o  the 
re sponde nt s '  own pol icy and pol itical preferenc e s ,  general ly in a 
d i s sonance-reducing manne r .  
16 . r from ( 197 9b ) , Figur e s  1 and 2 ;  b from ( 197 9b ) , Tabl e  2 .yp y . p  
17 . Rod Kiew i e t ,  per sonal communicat ion .  
lHE ECOLOGICAL FALLACY REVISITED: AGGREGATE- VERSUS INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
FINDINGS <J; ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS, AND SOCIOTROPIC VOTING 
APPENDIX 
THE MODEL 
( 1 )  
( 2 )  
i = 1 ,2 ,  • • • •  n yoters. 
elect ions. t 
vit
gi t
ei t
yit
vit
1 ,2 I • • •  IT 
i ' s  vote in elect i on t .  
the government- induced change in i ' s  income a t  e l ec t i on t .  
the idiosyncratic part of i ' s income change a t  t .  
g i t  + e i t ' the total change in i ' s  income at t .
ai + pg i t ' the true , de termini s t i c ,  behavioral rel at i on 
be tween government-induced e conomic effect s and i ' s  vote, to be 
est imated. 
SOME BASIC IDENTITIBS AND DEFINITIONS 
Aggregate-level variab l e s :  
( 3 )  
( 4 )  
( 5 )  
Vt 1 /n L i v it ' the aggregate vote for the 
incumbent at elect ion t .  
V = 1 /T L t Vt ' the mean of Vt over the T elect i ons.
Gt 1 /n L t git ' the aggregate or average government-induced
income change at t .  
2 
( 6 )  G = 1/T L t Gt . 
( 7 )  Et = 1 /n L i ei t ' the aggregate or average idi osyncratic change at t .
( 8 )  E = 1/T L t Et . 
( 9)  Yt = 1/n L i Yit ' the change in per-capita income at t.
( 10) y = 1/T L t yt " 
Aggregat ing the ident i ty ( 1) , using ( 5 )  - ( 10) , we obtain: 
( 11 )  yt = 1/n L i [ g i t + e it] 
( 12 )  Y = G + E .  
Gt + Et • 
( 13 )  (Yt - Y) = ( Gt - G) + ( Et - E) . 
S imilarly , aggregating the behavioral rel ation (2) and us ing ( 3 )  and 
( 5 )  we have : 
( 14) Vt = 1/n L i vit = 1/n L i [ai + pg it ] = a +  PGt ' 
where by a we denote the quant i ty 1/n L i ai ' the mean parti sanship of
the el ectorat e ,  Simil arly, 
( 15 )  V = 1/T L t Vt = a + PG ,
( 16 )  ( Vt - V )  = a - PGt - (a  + PG) = P (Gt - G) . 
Ind ividual- leve l yar iables ( for a fixed el ect ion t and vary ing acros s 
indiv idua l s ) : 
( 17 ) ( yit - Yt ) = ( git - Gt ) + ( e it - Et ) ' from ( 1) and (11) , and
(18) (vit - Vt ) = ai + pgit - (a + PGt ) ( ai - a) + p ( git - Gt )
from ( 2) and (14) . 
Finally, we recall that in a simpl e bivariate regression of P .  on Q . ,  
J J 
j = l ,  • • •  ,J, the formula for the regression coefficient b is  
(19) b 
[ j (P j - P) (Qj -
Q)
\ - 2Lj (Qj - Q) 
cov(P j ,Qi ) 
var(Qj )
where P, cov(Pj , Qj ) , var(Qj ) ' etc. denote the sample means,
covariances, and variances over the J units of observation. 
THE AGGREGATE, TIME- SERIBS REGRESSION 
Regressing Vt on Yt over al l T elect ions yields ( from 19) the
t ime series regression coefficient bTS :
bTS 
l/T Lt (Vt - V) (Yt - Y)
l/T L t (Yt - Y)
2
Using (16)  we get 
bTS 
( 20a) 
l/T L tP (Gt - G) (Yt - Y)
varTS (Yt )
TS ( G y )cov t ' t p 
varTS(Yt )
3 
Equival ently, us ing (13 ) , we get 
bTS 
l/T L tP (Gt - G) [ CG , � 3) + (Et - E) ]
l/T Lt [ ( Gt - G) + (Et - E) ] 2 
l/T P C[t<Gt - o> 2 + Lt (Gt - G) (Et - E) ]
4 
l/T c[ t <Gt - 'G> + 2[t <ot - °G> <Et - 'E> + Lt <Et - 'E>
21
( 20b ) 
TS TS var (Gt )  + cov ( Gt , Et )  
= P TS TS TS var ( Gt) + 2cov ( Gt ,Et ) + var (Et)
Here varTS and covTS denote the time series variances and covariance s
of  the aggregate-level variables, over the sample of T elect i ons. 
THE CROSS-SECTIONAL, MICRC>-LEVEL REGRESSION 
For f ixed t, regressing v it on yit across individual s  yields
( from 19) the cross-sectional regression coefficient bes :
bes =
l /n L i( vit - Vt) (yit - Yt )
. .- - 2 l/n L i(yit - Yt) 
1/n L i[ (ai - ;;-) + p (g it - Gt ) ] (yit - Yt)
l/n L i(yit - Yt )
2
1/n L i[ (ai - a) + p (git - Gt) ] [ (git - Gt) + ( e it - Et ) ]
1/n L i[ (git - Gt )
2 + 2 ( git - Gt ) ( e it - Et ) + ( e it - Et )
2]
s 
p l/n L: i [ (git - Gt )
2 + ( git - Gt ) ( e it - Et ) ]
l/n L: i[ ( git - Gt)
2 + 2 ( git - Gt ) (e it - Et ) + ( e it - Et )
2
]
+ 2 2 • 
l/n L i[ ( git - Gt) + 2 ( git - Gt ) (e it - Et ) + ( e it - Et ) ] 
1/n L i(ai - a) [ (� Gt) __ +_( eit - Et) ] 
Expressing these in terms of variances and covariances, the 
estimate becomes 
( 21 a) bes
( 21b ) 
( 21c ) 
cs cov ( v  it' y u> 
cs var ( yit )
cs covcs( git,yit ) + = P cs< >var Y it 
cov ( ai ,yit ) 
cs var (yit )
= p 
cs cs var ( git ) + cov _ ( git, e it ) 
cs cs cs var ( git ) + 2cov (git ' e it ) + var ( e it )
cs cs 
+ 
cov (ai, git )  + cov ( ai, eit ) 
cs cs cs var ( g it ) + 2cov ( git ' eit ) + var ( e it )
Here varcs, coves denote cross-sectional variances and covariances,
which in general are quite different from the time-series variances 
and covariances of the corre sponding aggregate-level variables .  
6 
ALlRUISTIC OR "SOCIOlROPIC" VOTERS 
Voter i is altrui st ic or "sociotropic" if he base s his vote on 
Gt ' the administration' s overal l performance in handl ing the economy
in general , rather than on git' its performance in improving i ' s
individual wel lbeing .  Thus , instead of ( 2) , the behavioral rel ation 
governing i ' s  voting behavior wil l  be 
(22) vit = 11i + P2Gt '
where p2 is the (true ) "sociotropic" t>ffect . Aggregating this over
individuals we ge t 
( 23 )  Vt 1/n L i(ai + p2Gt ) = a +  P2Gt' so
( 24) ( vit - Vt) ( ai + p2Gt) - ( a  + P2Gt ) ( a . - ;;)1 
Simil arly, aggregating Vt over the T elect ions we obtain, from ( 23 )
and (6 ) : 
( 25) v = 1/T L t <;; + p2Gt) = a +  P2G, so
(26 )  (Vt - V) ( �  + P2Gt ) - ( a  + p2G> = p2( Gt - G) 
Suppose we now repeat the various aggregate and cross-
sectional regressions for a "sociotropic" electorate . For the 
aggregate time-series regression, the coefficient wil l be 
bTS = 
1/T L:t (Vt - V) (Yt - Y)
1/T L t (Yt - Y)
2 from ( 19) 
( 27 ) bTS 
1/T [ p2cGt - °G> <Yt - Y>
1/T L t (Yt - y)
2 
TS cov ( Gt'Yt) 
P2 TS var (Yt )
from ( 26 ) , i . e .  
which is the same as (20a) . I n  the cross-section, regressing 
v it on y it g ives
( 28) 
bes =
l/n Li< vit - Vt) (yit - Yt) 
l/n L i( yit - Yt )
2
bes 
l/n Li(4i - ;) (yit - Yt )
l/n L i( yit - Yt )
2
cs cov ( ai ,yit) 
cs var ( yit )
from (19) 
from (24) , i . e .  
More general ly, i f  voters respond to  both personal and 
al truist ic considerations, we can write 
(29) vit = 4i 
+ plgit 
+ P26t •
where p1 is now the true "self-interested" effect (previously def ined
by p1 in (2) ) , and p2 is again the true "sociotropic" effect . From
this it is readily shown that 
(Vt - V) < P1 + P2> < Gt - G) and
7 
( 30) ( vit - Vt ) = ( ai -
;) + P1< git - 6t) '
which is identical to (18) . Thus the time-series estimate (27) 
becomes 
(31) bTS = ( pl + P2>
TS cov ( Gt'Yt )  
varTS(Yt )
while the cros s-sectional estimate (28) becomes 
(32) b
es = P1 
cs cov ( git , yit ) + 
cs ) var ( yit
cs cov (ai ,yit ) 
cs var (yit)
Thia is  identical to (21b ) . 
PERFORMANCE RATINGS 
Let pit be individual i ' s  asse s sment or rating of the
admini stration' s overal l performance in handl ing the economy in 
general , in period t .  As usual we def ine the mean assessment a t  t ,  
pt = 1/n [ pit • 
In a simpl e bivariate regression of votes on performance ratings ,  the 
cross-se ctional regression coefficient is then 
(33 ) b
es 
p 
cs cov (vit, pit) 
cs var (pit )
l /n L i(vit - Vt ) (pit - Pt) 
cs var (pit )
For a sel f-interested voter ( again denoting by p1 the "self-interest"
8 
9 
parameter P of ( 2) )  this be comes 
bes p 
l/n [i[ ( ai - ;;:) + P1( git - Gt) ]  ( pit - Pt ) 
cs from ( 3 0) 
(34) 
var (pi t ) 
cs ) c ov ( git. pit P1 cs var (pit ) 
+ 
cs cov ( ai, pit) 
cs var (p i t ) 
On the other hand, for a " sociotropic" vot er, we have s imply 
( 3 5 )  
bes p 
l /n [ ic ai - ;;:) (pit - Pt ) 
cs var (pit ) 
cs cov C ai , pit ) 
cs var (p it ) 
from ( 24) 
( In the gene ral case ( 29) of both personal and sociotropic 
e ffect s ,  the expre s si on (30) again hol ds , so the cro s s-sectional 
coefficient is st i l l  as in (34) , )
Fina l ly,  suppo se w e  do a mul t iple regr e s s ion ( a cross 
indiv idual s )  which include s both indiv idual wel lbe ing y it and 
performance ratings pi t  a s  expl anat ory var iab l e s ,  Omitting the CS 
super script s and it subscript s ,  and denot ing by b and b the p . y  y . p  
l east-squares coe f f ic ient s o f  these two variab l e s  i n  the mul tipl e 
regres sion, the normal equa tions for th i s  regre s sion can be written as 
( 36 )  
(37)  
c ov( v , y) = b var ( y) + b cov ( p , y) y . p  p . y  
c ov( v,p)  = b cov ( p , y) + b var(p)  y . p  p .y 
Solving (37)  for b and us ing (3�)  we have p . y  
( 3 8) b p . y
cov(v,p) _ b c ov(p.y) var(p)  y.p  var ( p )
s 
b - b r (�) P y . p  YP S y 
where by r , S , S we denote the sampl e corre l ation be tw een, and yp p y 
10 
st andard dev iations of , y and p, and b is the bivariate c o e f f icient p 
obt aine d  by regressing vot e s  on performance ratings as in ( 3 3 )  • 
Simil arly, ( 3 7 )  can be rewritten as 
(39) b y .p 
s 
b - b r cJ> Y p . y  YP S p 
when b is the b ivariate coefficient bCS of ( 21 )  or ( 28 )  abov e .y 
